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TRUSTS-JURISDICTION-TRUSTEE AND TRUST AssETS OUTSIDE 
JurusmcnoN OF FORUM-Problems relating to jurisdiction of courts 
to try actions involving trusts of personal property have taken on 
greater importance in recent years because of the increased shifting 
of population from one state to another. Jurisdiction, as used in 
the following discussion of these problems, refers to the power of 
a court to create interests which will be recognized as valid in 
other states. It is distinguished from problems of choice of law, 
i.e., problems as to which state's law will be applied to a particular 
legal question. It is further distinguished from due process prob-
lems of notice and opportunity to be heard.1 
A court has jurisdiction to pass on an action involving a trust 
where both the trustee and trust property are before it.2 Further, 
if a court has parties to a trust, and not the trust property, before 
it, it also has jurisdiction to act, but can act only in personam, Le., 
against the parties who are before it.3 Thus, for example, such a 
court may determine the liability of a trustee who is before it, but 
may not resolve a contest between two beneficiaries who are not 
before it.4 If, on the other hand, the trust property alone is with-
in the jurisdiction of a court, such court has the power to decide 
all questions pertaining to the trust even though the trustees and 
beneficiaries are nonresidents.5 There are certain situations 
where trust property may be subject to the jurisdiction of a court 
independent of the presence of the physical trust assets and trustee 
within the state, thus giving such court complete jurisdiction over 
the trust. Such situations usually involve a subsisting relationship 
of some sort between the forum and the trust assets or the parties 
to the trust. The courts are not in full agreement as to the nature 
of this relationship and they resort to many varied rationales with 
which to support their conclusions. The purpose of this comment 
is to examine these rationales and determine their validity-first 
as to testamentary trusts and then as to inter vivos trusts. 
I. Testamentary Trusts 
A. Trustee as officer of probate court or trust assets in custodia 
legis. A court will have the power to decide questions concern-
1 Perry, "The Mullane Doctrine-A Reappraisal of Statutory Notice Requirements," 
CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 33 at 40-41 (1952). 
2 DuPuy v. Standard Mineral Co., 88 Me. 202, 33 A. 976 (1895); Braman v. Braman, 
236 App. Div. 164, 258 N.Y.S. 181 (1932). 
3 Harvey v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 299 Mass. 457, 13 N.E. (2d) 299 (1938). 
4LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 259 (1940). 
5 Erdheim v. Mabee, 305 N.Y. 307, 113 N.E. (2d) 433 (1953); Clark v. Williard, 294 
U.S. 2ll (1935). 
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ing a trust where a testator, whose will created the trust, died while 
domiciled within the jurisdiction of such court, and his will was 
probated in such court. This applies irrespective of the fact that 
the trustee and trust assets are either legally or illegally in an-
other state. The most common reasons given in support of this 
conclusion are that the trust assets are in custodia legis or that the 
testamentary trustee is an officer of that court. 
In Marsh v. Marsh's Executors6 a beneficiary requested that the 
New Jersey court order a trustee to make an accounting of his 
trust assets. The will which created the trust had been probated 
in New York, the domicile of the testator at the time of his death. 
The trust had not been before a New York court at any other time 
and at the time of the action much of the trust property was in 
New Jersey. Despite the fact that the New Jersey court had in 
personam jurisdiction over the trustee, it deferred to the jurisdic-
tion of New York, holding that the New York probate court held 
the trust assets in custodia legis and that the trustees were officers 
of such court. "This results from the fact that the trustees derive 
title through the probate of the will and the receipt of letters 
testamentary from the New York court, and that court has therefore 
jurisdiction for the settlement of the trustees' accounts, wherever 
they may reside.''7 
] enkins v. Lester" involved a suit in Massachusetts by a creditor 
of a beneficiary against a testamentary trustee to recover payment 
out of the trust fund. The trustee was domiciled, and the trust 
assets located, in Massachusetts. The testator had been domiciled 
in New York at the time of his death, and his will was probated in 
that state. Although the trust had never been before a New York 
court subsequent to the probate proceedings, the Massachusetts. 
court held that suit should be brought in New York since the 
testamentary trustee is an officer of the court which probated the 
will which created the trust. "The case does not differ in principle 
from that of an executor or administrator appointed in another 
State, who is not responsible in this Commonwealth for assets 
received here, if he has not here taken out letters of administration, 
nor for assets received in the other State, even if he has taken out 
6 73 N.J. Eq. 99, 67 A. 706 (1907). 
7 Id. at 104. 
s 131 Mass. 355 (1881). 
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ancillary administration in this Commonwealth."9 Today it is 
generally recognized that a testamentary trustee may sue or be 
sued wherever he or the trust assets are found.10 
A recent decision by a New York court reaffirmed the doctrine 
that a court of original probate, because it holds the trust assets in 
custodia legis, has jurisdiction over all actions involving a trust 
created by a will which was probated in such court. In In re 
Barrett's Estate11 the power of a New York probate court, which 
probated the will creating the trust, to determine the validity of 
the exercise by will of a power of appointment over the trust assets 
by a deceased New Jersey resident was questioned. The creator 
of the trust had died in New York in 1934, where he was then 
domiciled. He left certain properties in trust to a New Jersey 
corporation for the benefit of A, a resident of New Jersey, for life, 
remainder to whom A appoints by will. A died in 1938 and his 
will, which purportedly exercised such power, was probated in 
New Jersey. Heirs of the testator attacked the validity of such 
exercise. The New York probate court, holding that it had 
power to determine this question, reasoned that the trust property 
was still part of the estate of the testator.12 The situs of the trust 
was not fixed by the physical location of the trust assets in New 
Jersey nor the residency of the donee in that state, but by the 
domicile of the testator and the location of the trust assets in New 
York at the time of the testator's death. This, according to the 
court, made the trust property in custodia legis of the New York 
probate court. Thus, the court held that "wherever the fund now 
may be physically located, this court has jurisdiction to construe 
the will and to determine the validity of the exercise of the power 
f • "13 o appomtment .... 
Absent statute, it is incorrect to equate a testamentary trustee 
to an executor.14 An executor has no authority to act on behalf of 
the decedent's estate until he is commissioned by the probate 
court. A testamentary trustee, on the other hand, takes as a devisee 
ll!d. at 357. 
10 See notes 3 and 5 supra. 
11206 Misc. 363, 132 N.Y.S. (2d) 755 (1954). 
12 The problem of choice of law must not be confused with jurisdiction in this case. 
The law of New York, since the power was created under it, would quite clearly apply in 
determining the validity of the exercise of the power. However, this does not mean that 
New York has the jurisdictional power to apply its own law. 
13 Matter of Barrett, 206 Misc. 363 at 366, 132 N.Y.S. (2d) 755 (1954). 
14 In re Beauchamp's Estate, (Mo. App. 19·15) 184 S.W. 729; Farmers Loan and Trust 
Co. v. Pendleton, 37 Misc. 256, 75 N.Y.S. 294 (1902). 
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or legatee under the will.16 An executor can sue or be sued, absent 
statute, only in the jurisdiction in which he was appointed.10 A 
testamentary trustee may sue or be sued, in matters relating to the 
trust, wherever he can be found, or wherever the physical trust 
assets are located.17 However, modern statutes have shown a 
marked trend toward intervention by the probate courts.18 In 
some states the administration of a testamentary trust is a proceed-
ing in the probate court much the same as the administration of 
a decedent's estate.19 Thus, testamentary trustees may be required 
to file oaths or bonds or _other undertakings that they will faith-
fully perform their duties, and letters of administration are often 
issued -to them as evidence that they are still acting as trustees. 
Further, inventories, appraisals, and periodic accountings are often 
provided for. It is very likely that where such a statute applies, 
the probate court will have continuing jurisdiction over all suits 
relating to the testamentary trust. Nevertheless, where such a 
statute is not applicable, it cannot be said that the testamentary 
trustee is an officer of the probate court. Indeed, the courts which 
have relied on this rationale were not in jurisdictions which had 
such statutes at the time the cases were decided. 
For the same reasons it cannot be said that the trust assets are 
held in custodia legis by the probate court unless such is authorized 
by statute. The only act which the probate court performs in the 
course of its administration of the testator's estate with_ respect to 
the trust assets is the admission of the will to probate_ and the de-
cree distributing the trust estate to the trustee. It does not make 
any affirmative decree with respect to either the trustee or trust 
15 Burrows v. Goodman, (2d Cir. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 92; Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 
363, 128 N.E. 216 (1920). 
16 Capron, "Situs of Trusts in Conflict of Laws,'' 93 TRUSTS AND EsrATES 878 at 882 
(1954). 
17Ibid. 
18 See SIMES AND FRATCHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY ADMIN· 
ISTRATION 9 (1956); IA BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §151 (1951); Kayser, "Judicial Super-
vision of the Administration of Trusts,'' 35 MICH. L. R.Ev. 479 (1937). 
10 See, for example, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§704.l, 704.3, 704.28, 704.38, 704.5G, 
707.2; Ohio Rev. Code (1953) c. 2109. See generally 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 
§§963-968 (1948). The Proqate Courf for Washtenaw County interprets the Michigan 
statute as requiring that (a) the trustee file bond for the full amount of personalty, (b) 
the probate judge appoint the trustee by issuing letters of trusteeship, and (c) the trustee 
account to the probate court yearly. The trust is filed with the probate court under the 
same case number as the original probate proceeding. 
The Uniform Trustees' Accounting Act, which has I).Ot been adopted by any state, 
requires, both as to inter vivos and testamentary trusts, that the trustee file an inventory 
with the court, and that he make accountings annually, at the time of distributions and 
upon termination of the trust. 9A U.L.A. 322 (1951). 
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assets as such. Absent statute, the probate court retains no more 
control over assets distributed to a testamentary trustee than it does 
over assets distributed to any other legatee or devisee. 
B. Mobilia sequuntur personam. Courts have also resorted 
to the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam in order to locate the 
situs of a trust within their jurisdiction, irrespective of the location 
of the physical trust assets. In re Hoyt20 involved a petition by a 
nonresident trustee for an accounting in a New York probate 
court. The trust assets were at all times physically located in New 
York. The testator's will had been probated in New York, al-
though the testator had been a domiciliary of another state. The 
court rejected the theory that the testamentary trustee was an 
officer of the probate court since the will and not the court had 
appointed him. However, since personalty follows its owner, the 
legal situs of the trust is in the state where the testator resided at 
the time of his death, not the state where the will was probated or 
where the physical property is located. 
The use of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam as a means 
of locating the legal situs of the trust res is little more than make-
weight, and courts now generally recognize it as such.21 But even 
if we accept its validity, the trustee is the legal owner of the trust 
assets and such assets would be located at his domicile, not that of 
the testator. This argument should be used in conjunction with 
a theory such as that the trust assets remain in custodia legis al-
though the trustee subsequently removes them from the state, 
even though the New York court in the Hoyt case specifically re-
jected this doctrine. 
C. Continuing jurisdiction over single action. It has been 
held that since all proceedings involving a trust are part of a single 
action, once jurisdiction is obtained over the trustee and trust 
assets such jurisdiction continues throughout all subsequent pro-
ceedings. In Boone v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Company22 the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia enter-
tained a suit on a judgment by the court of original probate in 
North Carolina, which had ordered the removal of the appellant 
as trustee of a testamentary trust. The trustee and trust assets 
were in the District of Columbia at the time of the North Carolina 
20103 Misc. 614, 170 N.Y.S. 846 (1918). 
21 Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933). See generally LAND, TRusrs 
IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 18-20 (1940). 
22 (D.C. Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 809. 
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suit. The testator was domiciled in North Carolina at the time of 
his death, and the trustee was a domiciliary of, and the trust assets 
located in, that state at the time the will was probated. The dis-
trict court held that the North Carolina judgment must be ac-
corded full faith and credit, and ordered the trust funds turned 
over to the successor trustee pursuant to an accounting by an officer 
of the district court. It gave three separate reasons for its decision. 
First, the court of probate, having established the trust and ap-
pointed the trustee can remove him, wherever he may be, by a 
quasi-in-rem proceeding. Secondly, the probate court has con-
tinuing jurisdiction over the trust assets, which form the res upon 
which the quasi-in-rem proceeding is based. It equated such 
jurisdiction with the situation where assets have been attached by 
a court prior to their removal from the jurisdiction, differentiating 
the case where an inter vivos trust has never been before a court.23 
Thirdly, the removal of a trustee is part of the general supervisory 
proceeding in the court in which the trust is administered. The 
court, having obtained in per.sonam jurisdiction over the trustee 
during the original probate proceedings, such jurisdiction con-
tinues throughout the existence of the trust, each subsequent trust 
proceeding being part of the original probate action. In support 
of this final reason, the district court cited the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Michigan Trust Company v. 
Ferry,24 which held that a state may make all proceedings involved 
in the probate of a will part of a single action. In evaluating the 
rationale of the District of Columbia court, it should be noted that 
North Carolina has no statute making all actions involving a trust 
part of a single action, and that the North Carolina court did not 
expressly reserve jurisdiction either over the trustee or the trust 
assets. It is true that there is a doctrine that an equity court, once 
-having jurisdiction over a trust, will continue to have that jurisdic-
tion throughout the life of the trust.25 But the probate proceed-
23 The court differentiated the case of Parker v. Kelley, (W.D. N.Y. 1908) 166 F. 968, 
in which it was held that New York did not have to give full faith and credit to a 
Massachusetts decree removing the trustee of an inter vivos trust which had been created 
in Massachusetts, when the trustee and trust assets were in New York. The circuit court 
held that Massachusetts would have had jurisdiction if the trust had at any time been 
before one of its courts. 
24 228 U.S. 346 (1913). 
25 Capron, "Situs of Trusts in Conflict of Laws," 93 TRUSTS AND EsrATES 878 at 883 
(1954). The trust had been before the North Carolina court for accounting purposes 
several times after the probate proceedings, but the district court did not base its decision 
on this fact. 
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ing cannot be properly termed an action involving the trust, since 
the will and not the probate court appoints the testamentary 
trustee.26 A testamentary trust, immediately after the probate 
proceedings, should be considered in essence no different from an 
inter vivos trust which has never been before a court. 
_ D. Intent of the testator. Some courts have held that a testator 
may establish the legal situs of a testamentary trust, for jurisdic-
tional purposes, in a jurisdiction other than the one in which he 
was domiciled at the time of his death and in which his will was 
probated. The usual method is to infer that the testator intended 
that the legal situs of the trust be located in the state which has the 
most connections with the trust. The factors usually taken into 
account are (a) the domicile of the testator at the time of his death, 
(b) the state where the will was originally probated, (c) the 
domicile of the trustee at the time the will was probated, ( d) the 
state where the testator directed that the property be located, and 
( e) the domicile of the beneficiaries. at the time the will was 
probated.27 Thus, in Reynolds v. Reynolds28 the North Carolina 
court held that it had jurisdiction over a Maryland trust company, 
the trustee of a testamentary trust, because all the above factors 
centered in North Carolina except the location of the trust prop-
erty and the trustee in Maryland. In Matter of Rogers29 the New 
York court held that the state in which the testator directed that 
the trust be administered is the controlling factor. 
The main criticism of placing the legal situs of a trust in the 
state in which the testator intends it to be is that it lends uncer-
tainty to the law. However, it has the advantage of being realistic 
and providing the beneficiaries with the protection that the testa-
tor contemplated. If a testator provides that trust funds be ad-
ministered in a particular state, he undoubtedly must contemplate 
that the courts of that state will give protection to the beneficiaries 
of the trust. Further, the courts of the state in which the trust is 
being administered are in a better position to supervise the trust. 
Despite these virtues, most courts have placed the legal situs of a 
trust in the state in which the testator was domiciled at the time 
26 See note 15 supra. 
27 Swabenland, "The Conflict of Laws in Administration of Express Trusts of Per-
sonal Property," 45 YALE L.J. 438 (1936). 
28 208 N.C. 578 at 627, 182 S.E. 341 (1935). 
20 225 App. Div. 286, 232 N.Y.S. 609 (1929), affd. 254 N.Y. 592, 173 N.E. 880 (1930). 
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of his death and in which his will was probated, irrespective of 
the state where he directed that the trust be administered.30 
It is impossible, because of the sparsity of the case law and the 
contradictory theories of the courts, to evolve a general rule re-
garding jurisdiction over testamentary trusts when neither the 
trustee nor trust assets are physically within the jurisdiction of a 
court.31 Although it is not indicated by the cases, it is likely that 
a court would be influenced by the type of action before it. If it 
has been alleged that the trustee has illegally removed the trust 
assets from the state, a court will find some way of justifying its 
jurisdiction over the action. However, if the action is one for a 
voluntary accounting by the trustee, a court may find that it does 
not have jurisdiction over the action, holding that the testator in-
tended the trust to have its situs in another jurisdiction or that the 
accounting should be made in the court of original probate, de-
pending on the fact situation.32 
II. Inter Vivos Trusts 
Where the courts of a settlor' s domicile have had no contact 
with an inter vivos trust, such courts cannot predicate jurisdiction 
over the trust on theories of custodia legis or continuing jurisdic-
tion. Thus, in Parker v. Kelley,33 a federal court held that New 
York did not have to give full faith and credit to a Massachusetts 
decree removing a New York trustee, despite the fact that the 
deed of trust had been executed in Massachusetts by a domiciliary 
of that state. In Matter of Berry34 a New York court similarly re-
fused to entertain a suit by a settlor for termination of a trust, 
despite the fact that the settlor was domiciled, and the trust assets 
located, in New York. The court reasoned that the situs of the 
30 Jenkins v. Lester, 131 Mass. 355 (1881); In re Barrett's Estate, 206 Misc. 363, 132 
N.Y.S. (2d) 755 (1954); In re Hoyt, 103 Misc. 614, 170 N.Y.S. 846 (1918). 
31 See, however, 1 PERRY, TRusrs AND TRUSTEES, 7th ed., §71, p. 56 (1929), to the effect 
that if a trust is created by the will of a citizen of a state, and his will is probated there, 
and the court of that state appoints a trustee, the equity court will have jurisdiction, even 
though the property and the trustee are outside the court's jurisdiction. 
32 These observations should not be confused with the right of a court to defer, on 
equitable principles, jurisdiction to the courts of another state. See LAND, TRusrs IN THE 
CONFLICT OF LAws, 261 et seq. (1940). The case of Jenkins v. Lester, 131 Mass. 355 (1881) 
is in direct conflict with the observations of the author. There the court held that it did 
not have jurisdiction over an action by creditors of a beneficiary even though the trust 
was administered in Massachusetts. 
33 (W.D. N.Y. 1908) 166 F. 968. Accord: Holcomb v. Kelley, 114 N.Y.S. 1048 (1907); 
Newlin v. Newlin, 114 Ind. App. 574, 52 N.E. (2d) 503 (1944). 
34 178 App. Div. 144, 164 N.Y.S. 990 (1917). Accord, Lozier v. Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 
124 N.E. 167 (1919). 
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property followed the trustee who was domiciled in Massachusetts. 
Despite these decisions, the weight of authority places the legal 
situs of an inter vivos trust at either the domicile of the settlor 
at the time of the creation of the trust or the place intended by the 
settlor, thus giving such court continuing jurisdiction over actions 
involving the trust. 
A. Situs at domicile of settlor. It has been held that the legal 
situs of a trust, which forms the basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, 
is located at the domicile of the settlor, irrespective of where the 
deed of trust was executed, the trust property located, or the trustee 
domiciled. In Swetland v. Swetland,35 the leading authority for 
this proposition, a beneficiary sued a nonresident trustee in New 
Jersey, requesting an accounting and removal of the trustee. The 
deed of trust had been executed in New York by a New Jersey 
domiciliary. The court held that the situs of the trust was New 
Jersey, the domicile of the settlor at the time the deed of trust was 
executed, and that the courts of the situs of a trust have jurisdic-
tion to direct its administration and to require the trustee to ac-
count wherever he may reside. The Florida court made a similar 
holding in Henderson v. Usher.36 The deed of trust had been 
executed in Florida, the domicile of the settlor. At that time the 
trustees were domiciled in New Jersey and New York, and the 
trust assets were located in the latter state. The action was brought 
in order to determine the rights of the widow of the donee of a 
general testamentary power of appointment created by the deed of 
trust, who elected to take against her husband's will, to have the 
trust property included in her husband's estate. The Florida 
court, in holding that it had jurisdiction, said: 
"The rule is settled in this country that an inter vivos trust 
has its situs at the residence of the creator of the trust even 
though he subsequently removes to the state where the 
trustees and beneficiaries reside and dies there. This rule is 
not changed by reason of the fact that the trustee resides in 
another state ... or by reason of the fact that the trust prop-
erty has been converted under a general authority in the trust 
instrument and removed to another state."37 
B. Situs at place intended by the settlor. It has been held 
that the situs of an inter vivos trust is not necessarily at the domicile 
85105 N.J. Eq. 608, 149 A. 50 (1930), affd. 107 N.J. Eq. 504, 153 A. 907 (1931). 
80 118 Fla. 688, 160 S. 9 (1935). 
37 Id. at 693, 694. 
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of the settler, but at the place intended by the settler. The place 
so "intended" is held to be the state with a preponderance of con-
nections with the trust.38 In re Saddy30 involved a suit in New 
York by the settler of an inter vivos trust agreement for appoint-
ment of a successor trustee. The settler was at all times a domi-
-ciliary of New York and the trust agreement was executed in that 
state. The trust assets, consisting of promissory notes of corpora- · 
tions, were at all times in the possession of the trustee, a Pennsyl-
vania trust company. The New York court held that the intent 
of the settler, _as implied from the factual situation at the time the 
trust was created, determines what state has jurisdiction. Since 
most of the controlling factors were centered in Pennsylvania-
particularly the location of the trustee and trust property there-
the trust must be considered as having its situs in that state. Thus, 
the New York court did not gain jurisdiction over the nonresident 
beneficiary by constructive service outside of New York, and did 
not have the power to appoint a successor trustee. The court, in 
reaching its decision, relied wholly on "choice of law" authorities, 
suggesting either that it confused jurisdiction with choice of law, 
or that it considered the same principles applica"f?le to both. 
In essence there is no real distinction between the two ra-
tionales examined. Both hold that the state in which the situs of 
a trust is located has continuing quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over 
actions involving an inter vivos trust. One group of cases, as 
typified by the Swetland case, holds that the situs is located at the 
domicile of the settler at the time the deed of trust is executed. 
The other group, as typified by the Saddy case, holds that the situs 
is located in the state intended by the settlor. Possibly the dif-
ference between these holdings is due to a confusion. of jurisdic-
tional principles with choice of law principles. In cases involving 
the essential validity of a· deed of trust, the law of the settler's 
38 The facts taken into account are (a) domicile of the settlor at the time of the 
creation of the trust, (b) domicile of the trustee, (c) place of execution of the deed of 
trust; (d) location of the trust property at the time of execution of th~ deed of trust, and 
(e) location of the trust property at the time of the action. See Russell v. Joys, 227 Mass. 
263, 116 N.E. 549 (1917); Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N.E. 461 (1920). See 
generally Swabenland, "The Conflict of Laws in Administration of Express Trusts of Per-
sonal Property," 45 YALE L.J. 438 (1936). However, a settlor cannot confer jurisdiction on 
a state unless it has some real connection with the trust. In Harvey v. Fiduciary Trust 
Co., 299 Mass. 457, 13 N.E. (2d) 299 (1938), the fact that the beneficiary was domiciled 
in Ohio was not enough to allow a settlor to confer jurisdiction on that.state. 
so 129 N.Y.S. (2d) 163 (1954). 
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domicile generally governs.40 Where construction of the deed of 
trust or administration problems are in issue, the law of the state 
intended by the settlor generally governs.41 It does not neces-
sarily follow that because the law of a state governs a particular 
question, that that state has jurisdiction over the action. How-
ever, it is quite natural to make this inference. The only criticism 
that might be made of either approach is the inconvenience that it 
might cause a nonresident trustee. If a Pennsylvania resident is 
required to make an accounting to a New York court, the expense 
and inconvenience involved might offset any added protection to 
the beneficiaries. 
III. Conclusion 
One writer has offered a single theory by which jurisdiction, 
when the trustee and the physical trust assets are outside the 
jurisdiction of a court, can be determined in the case of both 
testamentary and inter vivos trusts.42 He distinguishes between 
two types of res which form the basis of quasi-in-rerr .. jurisdiction 
of the courts-one consisting of the location of the physical trust 
assets within the court's jurisdiction, and the other consisting of a 
non-physical relationship between the testator or settlor and his 
domicile. The latter arises either because the testator, at the time 
he died, or the settlor, at the time he executed the deed of trust, was 
domiciled within the jurisdiction of the court. It is a continuing 
relationship, much like the relationship of a married person to his 
domicile, which gives the courts of his domicile jurisdiction over 
the trust whether the testator or settlor, or the trustee, subsequently 
change their domicile, or the trust assets are located in another 
jurisdiction. This relationship, which the author calls the trust 
entity, could originally be established in a jurisdiction other than 
the testator's or settlor's domicile if an intent were expressed that 
it be in another state, and there were sufficient connections be-
tween the trust and that state. This theory forms a much more 
reasonable basis than those used in the cases discussed in this com-
40 Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., (Del. Ch. 1936) 186 A. 903. New 
York chooses the law which will uphold the validity of the deed of trust. See generally 
LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAws §26.l (1940). 
41 Matter of Dialogue, 159 Misc. 18, 287 N.Y.S. 237 (1936); Lanius v. "Fletcher, 100 
Tex. 550, IOI s.w. 1076 (1907). See generally LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAws 
§§28.2, 36 (1940). 
42 Capron, "Situs of Trusts in Conflict of Laws," 93 TRUSTS 8: EsrA.TES 878 (1954). 
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ment, and would support any ·of these holdings. It is essentially 
the same rationale used in the inter vivos trust cases, but differs 
from those used in the case of testamentary trusts. It protects the 
beneficiary at a time when trust assets can be easily moved from 
one state to another. However, if the trust entity is located in a 
jurisdiction other than the one in which the fund is administered, 
it might form the basis for a beneficiary to harass unreasonably 
the trustee and add unnecessary expense to the administration of 
the trust. But in such a case, a court has the right, on equitable 
principles, to defer jurisdiction to the courts of the state where the 
fund is being administered.43 
Richard ]. Riordan, S.Ed. 
43 See LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLicr OF LAWS §43 (1940). 
